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Precursor Analysis for Offshore Oil and Gas Drilling:  
From Prescriptive to Risk-Informed Regulation  
Roger M. Cooke, Heather L. Ross, and Adam Stern 
Abstract 
The Oil Spill Commission’s chartered mission—to “develop options to guard against … any oil 
spills associated with offshore drilling in the future” (National Commission 2010)—presents a major 
challenge: how to reduce the risk of low-frequency oil spill events, and especially high-consequence 
events like the Deepwater Horizon accident, when historical experience contains few oil spills of material 
scale and none approaching the significance of the Deepwater Horizon. In this paper, we consider 
precursor analysis as an answer to this challenge, addressing first its development and use in nuclear 
reactor regulation and then its applicability to offshore oil and gas drilling. We find that the nature of 
offshore drilling risks, the operating information obtainable by the regulator, and the learning curve 
provided by 30 years of nuclear experience make precursor analysis a promising option available to the 
U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) to bring cost-
effective, risk-informed oversight to bear on the threat of catastrophic oil spills. 
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Precursor Analysis for Offshore Oil and Gas Drilling:  
From Prescriptive to Risk-Informed Regulation  
Roger M. Cooke, Heather L. Ross, and Adam Stern 
All findings, opinions, statements, and recommendations contained in this report are solely those of its 
authors.  The report has been submitted to the staff of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill and Offshore Drilling, but the report is not the work product of the Commission or its staff, and should not be 
construed in any respect as the official or unofficial findings, opinions, statements, or recommendations of the 
Commission or its staff. 
Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations  
The Deepwater Horizon spill bears a striking resemblance to the Three Mile Island (TMI) 
disaster, an unprecedented catastrophic system failure resulting from a sequence of individual 
failures, no one of which was by itself unprecedented or catastrophic. After TMI, the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), recognizing the stepwise path to disaster, developed the 
Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) program to identify and guard against the opening steps of a 
potential disaster sequence. In this initial scoping paper, we look at whether a similar precursor 
analysis methodology is worth exploring for the U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 
Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) oversight of offshore drilling. We conclude that it is, 
and we recommend further steps in that effort.  
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any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for 
the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents 
that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, 
or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its 
endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and 
opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any 
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Conclusions 
1.  Focus. Precursor analysis targets outcomes—in this case, catastrophic oil spills—that 
are encompassed by broad regulatory oversight but are not the specific focus of that 
oversight. Given the dominant significance of such spills in the array of offshore 
harms to be guarded against by regulation, an effective purpose-built tool directed at 
spill prevention would improve oversight capability and respond to the learning from 
Deepwater Horizon. 
2.  Rigor. Existing regulatory arrangements to which precursor analysis would be added 
do not have the intellectual framework or quantification to recognize and evaluate 
spill precursor signals arising in day-to-day offshore operations. BOEMRE’s new 
Safety and Environmental Management System regulation relies on a narrative 
description of hazards and their mitigation, not on rigorous data analysis and risk 
estimation. Although description is useful, it tends to be static and lapse into 
boilerplate repetition over time.  
3.  Learning. The regulator is the entity best positioned to develop a tool that can harness 
the power of cumulating offshore operating data to focus on spill prevention. Such a 
tool provides a learning framework for both regulator and operator as drilling 
proceeds, and it encourages the development of rigorous risk analysis within the 
operator community, as it has done in the nuclear sector. 
4.  Experience. NRC’s Accident Sequence Precursor program, set up in a similar 
postcatastrophe situation to guard against future low-probability, high-damage system 
failure, provides the most established model for BOEMRE to consider in working 
toward a system of its own. Thirty years of experience with ASP will help BOEMRE 
evaluate how it may be useful to them and benefit from the learning curve it provides.  
5.  Challenge. There is no question that BOEMRE needs to build its scientific oversight 
capabilities using data from ongoing operating events, and no question that NRC has 
been able to do this successfully in the nuclear sector. Nevertheless, the challenge of 
introducing precursor analysis into offshore regulation is substantial. The number and 
diversity of regulated facilities, the variety of operating environments, the 
disparateness of operator characteristics and behavior, and the low baseline use of 
quantitative risk techniques make this an ambitious undertaking. 
6.  Efficiency. A successful oversight program requires considerable intellectual 
investment up front but limited manpower to run. NRC’s ASP program now involves Resources for the Future  Cooke, Ross, and Stern 
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about one man-year of effort to cover 104 commercial reactors, a fifth of its initial 
level. Anticipated budget stringency further strengthens the argument for analysis-
leveraged versus manpower-intensive oversight. 
7.  Imperative. BOEMRE has a rich database and thorough regulatory authority to 
develop and operate a scientific, risk-informed oversight program directed at 
preventing catastrophic oil spills. Whatever the method chosen, and whatever the 
challenges encountered, it should now embark on that path.  
Recommendations 
1.  Report. We recommend that the Oil Spill Commission address explicitly in its report 
the desirability of adding to BOEMRE a risk-informed oversight capability focused 
on preventing catastrophic oil spills and based on data from ongoing operating 
experience on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).  
2.  Follow-on. If the Commission finds such a new capability desirable, it will not have 
the time or resources to flesh out risk-informed spill oversight during its tenure. We 
recommend that it set up, or cause to be set up, an expert group of individuals with 
technical skills in risk analysis, knowledge of offshore oil and gas operations, and 
familiarity with BOEMRE oversight practices and capabilities. This “precursor 
group” would take the next steps to develop options for BOEMRE to establish a risk-
informed regulatory program directed at preventing catastrophic oil spills. We believe 
a small group of qualified personnel could develop such options in a six month time 
frame.  
Introduction 
Comprehensive review of federally regulated offshore oil and gas activity in the wake of 
the Deepwater Horizon spill is driving wholesale reconsideration of government oversight 
approaches and capabilities. Consensus is emerging on the need to shift regulation by BOEMRE 
away from a traditional prescriptive regime based on command, control, and compliance to a 
modern risk-informed regime in which the achievement of clear safety goals is a shared 
responsibility of government and industry, each with clearly demarcated responsibilities. After 
the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) on March 28, 1979, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) embarked on such a shift, charting a long trajectory of innovation and 
refinement that continue to this day. A major element of their effort is the Accident Sequence Resources for the Future  Cooke, Ross, and Stern 
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Precursor (ASP) program (Minarick and Kukielka 1982; Minarick et al. 1988; Minarick 1989; 
Cottrell et al. 1984), initiated in response to recommendations from the Lewis Committee review 
(Lewis et al. 1978) of the first comprehensive probabilistic risk analysis (NRC 1975). 
Risk-informed regulation is indicated for sectors where industry is technology driven, 
with a high rate of innovation and the potential for low-frequency events causing substantial 
harm to the public and the environment. The regulator cannot remain on the sidelines of 
technological innovation but must engage industry as a full partner in the achievement of safety 
goals. This partnership is not achieved by regulatory fiat; rather, it emerges from an evolutionary 
process that involves growing the analytic skills for risk quantification within industry, 
generating a data flow to support risk quantification, and fostering a safety culture based on 
quantitative risk analysis. 
This paper takes a first look at the role precursor analysis might play in BOEMRE’s new 
regulatory regime. Section 1 presents a short background on quantitative risk methodology. 
Section 2 discusses the history of the ASP program within the shift to risk-informed regulation at 
NRC. Section 3 considers the application of ASP methodology to offshore drilling. Section 4 
outlines how BOEMRE might build upon and extend current regulatory practice. Section 5 offers 
conclusions and next steps.  
1. Background on Quantitative Risk Analysis 
1.1 Risk-Informed Decisionmaking in Government Oversight 
The need for risk management in government oversight arises when an industry engages 
in activities that create the potential for low-frequency, high-consequence events—rare 
occurrences that could harm the general public and the environment. Risk management tools are 
used to proactively analyze the probability of such events based on past operational and test data. 
Risk values can be generated to monitor current operations and prioritize regulatory 
interventions. A number of federal agencies—the Federal Aviation Administration, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Energy, and the Food and Drug 
Administration—oversee industries whose activities pose significant risks to the public and 
therefore use risk management procedures in their regulatory process. Approaches to risk 
management in government agencies are not homogeneous, however. The focus here is on risk 
of engineered systems; the analysis of consequences of loss events is outside the present scope.  Resources for the Future  Cooke, Ross, and Stern 
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1.2 Basic Tools for Dealing with Risk 
Two basic tools used in operational risk management are probabilistic risk analysis 
(PRA) and accident sequence precursor (ASP) analysis. Both methods seek to answer the same 
risk-quantifying questions but differ in application and methodology. PRA was initiated in the 
aerospace sector; it models the failure probability of a complex system, such as a launch vehicle, 
in terms of failure probabilities of its components. These probabilities could be estimated from 
test data and used to predict system reliability in the absence of sufficient operating experience at 
the system level. ASP analysis is designed to operate on a population of similar systems. It trades 
in-depth system modeling for aggregate operational experience.  
Each method has strengths and weaknesses. The basic modeling tools of PRA are event 
trees and fault trees. Event trees describe initiating events that threaten the system and map their 
progression as successive layers of engineered safeguards are challenged. Fault trees model the 
response of safety subsystems down to the component level. The in-depth modeling of PRA fault 
trees affords many insights into the risk and reliability of the system. Designers plan for their 
systems to function properly; they are not accustomed to assuming that each component fails or 
examining how the failures propagate through the system. That is exactly what PRA does. The 
modeling exercise itself often reveals weakness in system design, such as insufficient 
redundancy, insufficient separation in engineered safeguards, and imprudent mixing of system 
control and safety functions. On the downside, PRA has a very large appetite for data that is 
difficult to appease at the level of an individual system. Test data generated during the design 
phase may ignore reliability growth. Test data produced during operations may not reflect 
dependencies that arise in actual operations. Test and operational data at a specific facility may 
be insufficient to quantify all relevant occurrence rates of initiators and response probabilities of 
defensive systems, thus creating a need for data from other sources. These include “generic” data 
and subjective engineering judgment. Human error and human recovery are important aspects of 
risk management whose modeling and quantification are largely subjective.  
ASP forgoes in-depth modeling at individual facilities and uses instead “generic” event 
trees. These event trees aim to reflect macroscopic design of the engineered safety systems. In 
the first generations of ASP implementation in the nuclear power industry, event trees were 
distinguished according to basic reactor type (boiling water or pressurized water) and initiator. 
The methodology requires an incident reporting system, and it requires analysts to map each 
relevant incident onto one or more generic event trees. The coarse-grained plant population 
perspective lacks specific detail but automatically captures system dependences that may be 
missed in PRA modeling, and it also captures human error and human recovery.  Resources for the Future  Cooke, Ross, and Stern 
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1.3 Illustrative ASP Calculation 
An example of a generic nuclear event tree is shown below (Minarick and Kukielka 
1982). Rather than explain all the details, we simply note that it refers to a “loss of main 
feedwater” at a pressurized water reactor, possibly leading to severe core damage.1 The tree 
starts with the initiator at the left. At each bifurcation the upward path is taken when the 
corresponding safety system functions properly; the downward path is taken when the system 
fails. 
After several hundred facility-years of operating experience, there are enough data to 
estimate most of the safety system failure probabilities and many of the initiating event 
frequencies. Unavailabilities of safety systems revealed during scheduled testing are also mapped 
into the event trees as accident precursors. Gaps can be filled by more generic data.  
Figure 2 shows the precursor at the Dresden 1 unit in Grundy, Illinois, in which the 
reactor failed to shut down (scram) under conditions (low primary drum level) that should have 
triggered a scram. Had this happened when the feedwater was still pressurized, it could have 
caused severe core damage. The particular conditions are described in the initiator box, and their 
probability is estimated at 0.56/year, or 0.56  360/8760 = 0.023 for the 360 hours during which 
this condition existed. The reactor scram failure is assigned probability 1. Given this initiator and 
given scram failure, severe core damage results if either the operator fails to detect the low drum 
level (probability 0.005) or if the operator does detect the level but the emergency condenser 
fails to provide core cooling (probability 0.995  0.005). The result is that the probability of 
severe core damage, given this precursor, is 0.023  (0.005+0.995  0.005) = 0.000229. This 
conditional core damage probability is the indicator of the severity of the precursor. Whereas the 
initiator in the generic event tree is loss of main feedwater, the probability calculation uses the 
specific type of main feedwater loss that triggers this particular sequence. The human error 
probabilities are generic. 
 
  
                                                 
1 “Severe core damage” refers to a set of physical circumstances previously called core melt. In these circumstances, 
the core reaches temperatures (2,200F) that cause the fuel rods to melt, as happened in the TMI accident of March 
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be subjected to quantitative risk analysis, and NRC’s Office for Analysis and Evaluation of 
Operational Data subsequently developed the Accident Sequence Precursor program. The 
original objective was to analyze accident sequence precursors with the PRA tools already being 
used to analyze plant specific risk. This capitalized on the advantages of the ASP method, as 
noted above, and leveraged the synergy of having complementary risk tools. 
The program’s main objectives and scope were altered throughout the 1980s, and a more 
permanent set of objectives was put in place in 1993. NRC listed five main objectives for the 
ASP program: 
  to identify and quantitatively estimate the risk significance of operational events;  
  to determine the generic implications of operational events and characterize risk insights 
from these events;  
  to provide supplemental information on plant-specific performance;  
  to provide a check on PRAs; and 
  to provide an empirical indication of industry risk and associated trends.  
The current ASP program is supported by an institutionalized incident reporting system 
that requires all nuclear power plants to report to NRC all operational events that represent a 
deviation from the licensing basis or a failure or degradation of a safety function (NRC 1991). 
These “licensee event reports” have a strict format and guidelines to ensure that NRC captures 
all possible problems. Once collected, the reports are placed through a screening process to 
identify accident precursors, defined as “an initiating event or degraded condition that, when 
coupled with one or more postulated events, could result in a plant condition involving 
inadequate core cooling and severe reactor core damage” (Minarick and Kukielka 1982).  
Once the precursors are identified, they are modeled in one or more generic event trees 
with various initiating events. In the year-end ASP reports, the precursors are ranked by their 
“conditional core damage probability,” which gives the probability that a particular precursor 
will cause severe core damage. These results are used to identify the most dangerous precursors 
and are compared with those from previous years to identify industry trends. APPENDIX 2 
shows some results from an NRC review in 2006. Significantly, the precursors in this review 
involving “degraded conditions”—unavailabilities of safety systems without the occurrence of an 
initiating event to challenge these systems—contribute significantly to the overall risk. These 
might easily be overlooked by an incident reporting system focused on initiating events. Resources for the Future  Cooke, Ross, and Stern 
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A recent review (Kadak and Matsuo 2007) identifies the following factors as ingredients 
for a successful transition from prescriptive to risk-informed regulation: 
  strong top management support and leadership both at the regulator and the licensee 
level; 
  education and training in risk principles and probabilistic risk assessment;  
  a slow and steady introduction of risk initiatives in areas that can show value to both 
regulator and industry;  
  a transparent regulatory foundation built around safety goals; and 
  development of a strong safety culture in industry allowing for more independence in 
safety compliance and risk management. 
In the nuclear sector, the PRA methodology was originally launched through “generic 
PRAs” performed under contract with NRC (1975). These were later adopted by industry and 
specialized to unique facilities. In 1988, NRC requested that each licensee conduct an individual 
plant examination allowing the identification of plant vulnerabilities (NRC 1988). The 
“maintenance rule” of 1991 allowed licensees to develop risk-informed maintenance programs 
based on these plant examinations. According to Kadak and Matsuo (2007, 611), “It is generally 
agreed that the Maintenance Rule and its application was the first major attempt at using risk 
information in developing a regulatory compliance strategy.” Essential in the transition to a risk-
informed regime was the fact that a small group of industry leaders formed a users’ group to 
further the application of risk analysis. “This small group influenced the overall industry position 
relative to risk-informed regulation and ultimately provided the focus for the Nuclear Energy 
Institute to begin an active dialog with the regulator on the adoption of the risk informed 
regulation and modifications to key rules” (Kadak and Matsuo 2007, 611).  
A PRA focuses on detailed plant modeling, and it is appropriately developed and owned 
by the licensee. In contrast, the ASP method is focused on a population of facilities falling under 
one regulatory authority, and it is developed and owned by this authority. As operating 
experience accumulates, the synergies of PRA and ASP increase, each benefiting from the 
strengths of the other. 
3. Precursor Analysis for Offshore Oil and Gas Drilling 
Beyond a demonstrated potential for catastrophic system failure, the nuclear and offshore 
oil and gas sectors exhibit some important parallels supporting the utility of ASP analysis: Resources for the Future  Cooke, Ross, and Stern 
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  each sector has a rich data history of relevant operational experience from which to 
observe past accident sequences and develop pertinent event trees;  
  within each sector, installations, equipment and procedures are similar, such that 
regulated facilities can be grouped into a limited number of classes for generic analysis; 
and 
  a baseline of operator logs and reports exists for each sector, plus regulator inspections 
and investigations on which to build the required information flow for precursor 
identification, monitoring, and evaluation.  
 This section considers each of these elements in turn. 
3.1 Rich Data History 
From the earliest days of offshore activity in the 1940s, the U.S. Geological Survey, later 
the Minerals Management Service and now BOEMRE have kept files regarding operations and 
oversight on the OCS. Published reports from these records, and from industry compilations, 
provide insight into safety experience over those nearly seven decades. Papers by Danenberger 
(1993) and Izon, Danenberger and Mayes (2007) analyze blowouts— sudden, uncontrolled 
escapes of hydrocarbons— during the years 1971–2006. None of the 126 blowouts in this period 
approached the Deepwater Horizon event in severity: 77 involved striking pressurized gas 
pockets at shallow well depth before reaching target productive intervals, and 83 were controlled 
by sediments bridging or sealing the well or by gas depletion. Looking at incidents over the 
period 1979–1988, Sharples et al. (1989) assessed the nature and relative risk associated with 
jackup rigs— mobile platforms that stand on the sea floor, supported by three or more legs—
compared with other rig types.  
The blowouts analyzed by Danenberger and the accidents considered by Sharples are 
modest compared with the Deepwater Horizon disaster. But the conditions and events that led to 
those failures could result in great harm, were they to occur in other circumstances, notably those 
now being encountered on the deepwater OCS. Thus the historical record is a rich database for 
ASP development offshore, just as it was in the nuclear sector, where precursor analysis was 
built on an operating history of much more limited events than the unprecedented core meltdown 
that prompted it. Resources for the Future  Cooke, Ross, and Stern 
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3.2 Generic Similarity  
As the interested public has learned from Deepwater Horizon reporting, offshore well 
drilling proceeds in a sequence of repetitive steps: drilling ahead with suitably dense mud to 
prevent fluid influx from the formations being penetrated; setting metal casing to enclose and 
reinforce the well segment just drilled before proceeding to drill a further segment with denser 
mud; cementing the casing that has just been set to secure it to the well wall and prevent any 
interstices that could allow hydrocarbons to migrate upward in the well; setting various hangars 
and plugs to ensure well strength and nonpenetration; and taking continual test measures, such as 
pressure readings and flow volumes, to confirm that well integrity is being maintained. 
Consolidating into a few events the performance of this often complex sequence of 
“down-hole” steps, one can draw a very simple event tree, as in Figure 3. A failure of one or 
more down-hole barriers—mud, casing, cement, plugs—if not recognized through integrity 
testing and rectified, and if the blowout preventer fails, result in complete system failure, as 
occurred in the Deepwater Horizon accident sequence. 
The tree in Figure 3 represents well control events at the broadest level of generic 
commonality. Trees for operational use will recognize different sequences of down-hole 
activities and potential accident paths. For example, one or more trees beginning with flawed 
cement as a “degraded condition” initiator are very likely to arise. Blowout analysis shows that 
cementing problems have increased significantly: they were associated with 46 percent of 
blowouts in 1992–2006 versus 26 percent in 1971–1991 (Danenberger 2007). As other features 
of offshore safety improved over the two periods, cementing performance did not. The first of 
eight major findings reported by the internal BP team investigating the Deepwater Horizon 
accident is, “The annulus cement barrier did not isolate the hydrocarbons” (BP Incident 
Investigation Team 2010, page 10).    
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marine environment, notably subsea pipelines, which can deteriorate over time, rupture, or suffer 
damage from snagging or seismic activity.  
The system failure of concern for all those event trees is “significant uncontrolled escape 
of hydrocarbons” (SUEH), analogous to “severe core damage” in the nuclear ASP program. 
NRC began with two sets of simplified event trees, boiling water reactors and pressurized 
water reactors, in the early 1980s. It now performs precursor analysis using 78 risk models 
representing all 104 units in current commercial operation. These risk models use an event tree–
fault tree linking methodology, and their proliferation over time has been the result of increasing 
fault tree specificity. A fault tree elaborates on the various ways an event tree failure (a “top 
event”) can occur. For offshore drilling, fault tree development that recognizes blowout 
preventer differentiation—optimal pressure rating, shearing, mix of ram types, redundancy, 
backup systems, etc. for different wells—will be an important part of powering up the ASP tool. 
Elaboration will happen over time. Both conceptual development and field implementation must 
walk before they can run; nevertheless, 30 years of NRC enhancement means that offshore 
oversight could start far along the ASP learning curve. An important part of that learning curve is 
seeing how the NRC created its earliest event trees and built up its capability from there. Another 
important part is seeing how regulator capability accelerated quantitative risk analysis capability 
in the regulated community.  
3.3 Baseline Information 
ASP-informed regulatory oversight runs on focused, timely information about current 
operations. This information is a mix of required operator reports and regulator-generated data 
from inspections and investigations. The centerpiece is operator reports of specified events that 
the ASP program reviews against a specific set of screening criteria to identify those events that 
should be reviewed as candidate precursors. Those not screened out are subject to detailed ASP 
analysis using the relevant risk model (event tree plus any fault tree elaboration), which will 
itself be adapted as needed to recognize the operational event in question. 
BOEMRE currently requires operators and other permit holders to immediately report 
any of a list of incidents involving material harm to workers or facilities or consequential 
operating irregularities (Incident Reporting Rule, 30 CFR 250.188). The agency may follow up 
such operator reports with an incident investigation, including panel meetings with subpoena 
power for testimony or documents, in order to prepare a public report that determines the cause 
or causes of the incident (30 CFR 250.191).  Resources for the Future  Cooke, Ross, and Stern 
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BOEMRE is also authorized and required by the OCS Lands Act to conduct scheduled 
on-site inspections of oil and gas operations at least once a year, plus periodic on-site inspections 
without advance notice (OCS Lands Act, Section 22(c)(1) and (2)). It performs these inspections 
using a checklist called the Potential Incident of Non-Compliance (PINC) list. These on-site 
inspections complete the suite of current operator and regulator safety documentation offshore, 
which parallels the enforcement reporting used by NRC to drive its ASP program. The Incident 
Reporting Rule, PINCs, and other elements of offshore safety oversight are discussed in more 
detail in Section 4.  
3.4 Sector Differences 
Despite the parallels between offshore and nuclear safety regulation, there are also 
differences to recognize. First and foremost is the thoroughgoing quantification that NRC has 
been able to introduce into its risk-informed oversight. Offshore regulation has a long way to go 
in this regard. The move underway toward safety case management, building on experience in 
the United Kingdom and Norway, is an important start. BOEMRE has published in the Federal 
Register a final rule requiring offshore oil and gas operators to develop and maintain a safety and 
environmental management system that makes mandatory the currently voluntary practices in the 
American Petroleum Institute’s Recommended Practice 75 (BOEMRE 2010; API 2004). These 
practices include, among other elements, a facility-level risk assessment. That assessment, 
however, consists largely of nonquantitative narrative; rigorous numerical risk estimation will 
need considerable development. A shift to risk quantification by the regulator, as with an ASP 
program, will encourage operators to develop their own risk quantification processes for their 
individual facilities. NRC’s quality assurance plan uses probabilistic risk assessment models 
developed by licensees for their individual facilities to review its own risk models and results.  
Offshore risk quantification may be aided by the increasing availability of automated data 
flows to real-time operating centers maintained by operators as a “second set of eyes” onshore. 
This is a stream of immediate information from which a focused ASP program could cull signals 
of potential precursor events. Although proprietary considerations would need to be taken into 
account, this potential for quick, efficient, focused, nondiscretionary signaling would be worth 
exploring.  
Another sector difference is the number and variety of regulated facilities: 104 
commercial nuclear plants versus approximately 6,500 active leases, 3,400 active platforms, and 
37,000 approved applications to drill in the Gulf of Mexico. Cultural differences may also be 
important; commercial nuclear operators all participate in the Institute of Nuclear Power Resources for the Future  Cooke, Ross, and Stern 
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Operations, an industry-run safety improvement organization, and have the same insurer, 
whereas the oil and gas industry has not traditionally engaged in such self-oversight or pooling 
arrangements. The multitude of facilities and the individualism of operators are both likely to 
introduce more disparity in the offshore regulatory universe than is observed in the nuclear 
sector.  
One area of similarity is the use the regulator can make of precursor results. The main 
objectives of the NRC program were discussed in Section 2. Accumulating knowledge about 
sources and magnitudes of risk enables more focused and up-to-date oversight. Results offshore 
can help evaluate proposed well designs and modification and waiver requests. The regulator can 
track sector trends over time. Monitoring of individual operations and operators’ performance 
can trigger calibrated regulatory responses, from closer monitoring, stationing on-site, fines, 
warnings, and shut-ins of components or facilities, to facility abandonment, equipment or 
procedure disallowance, or operator banishment.  
4. Current Regulatory Structure and Amenability to ASP 
The ASP program in the nuclear sector is made possible by a mandatory incident 
reporting system (the licensee event report) that identifies accident precursors. Reports are filed 
for events that take place at any time, including operations, testing, and maintenance. NRC 
inspectors are stationed at each facility. Though not part of the ASP program, which is run by the 
agency’s Office of Research, these inspectors, by virtue of their presence, enhance the safety 
culture at each plant. 
A 2004 comprehensive review of the history and practice of the ASP program in the 
nuclear sector (Sattison 2004) concludes with a list of lessons learned that can be directly applied 
to a future program for offshore oil and gas. Paraphrasing this review, a comprehensive accident 
precursor program should accomplish three goals: 
  Identify the nature of accident precursors for the industry and define precursor categories 
based on accident sequences determined from full-scope risk assessments for the entire 
range of facilities and systems.  
  Prioritize or rank precursor categories based on both frequency of occurrence and risk 
significance. Ranking by frequency of occurrence for each category of precursor 
indicates the weaknesses in facilities at risk for accidents. Ranking by risk significance 
focuses attention on the precursor categories that are most threatening. Because the Resources for the Future  Cooke, Ross, and Stern 
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analyses of these two ranking methods are quite different, the program should establish 
procedures and criteria for each. 
  Feed the results back to the industry. Analysis is useless unless it is reflected in the 
design, operation, and maintenance of facilities and systems. Vulnerabilities must be 
addressed to reduce the frequency of occurrence and to increase resistance to the 
consequences.  
To accomplish those goals, an accident precursor program should have the following 
characteristics: 
  The program should be owned by a competent authority and should provide insights into 
improving safety in the future. 
  The program must be supported by an appropriate infrastructure for gathering operational 
data and assuring that the authority has access to data providers when more detailed 
information is needed. Barriers to full and honest disclosure, such as proprietary 
information and fear of repercussions, must be addressed. Industry members must have 
incentives (either voluntary or by regulatory action) for participating. 
  The program should provide a trending and tracking system to correlate changes in 
industry design and practices with changes in the occurrence and nature of observed 
precursors.  
  Systems and methods should be sensitive enough to identify an operational event as a 
precursor without generating too many “false detects” of events of little interest.  
  Risk assessment in the industry must be mature enough to instill confidence that potential 
accident sequences have been identified and that the models used to assess events are 
sufficient and only need changes that reflect the configurations and operating practices of 
specific facilities.  
  Analysis should be performed on a continual basis by a consistent team of analysts to 
ensure the timeliness and consistency of results.  
The next section provides a quick scan of the incident reporting systems in the offshore 
oil industry, to assess their compatibility with the reporting requirements of an ASP program.  Resources for the Future  Cooke, Ross, and Stern 
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4.1 Potential Incidents of Noncompliance 
In current practice, all information regarding a breach in the operational or safety system 
is logged on-site; the report is then read during annual inspections by a BOEMRE official. 
Inspectors use a list of PINCs to determine whether a facility is operating up to standard. If a 
breach exists, an operator is issued a notice, called Incident of Non-Compliance (INC), with a 
warning, component shut-in, or a facility shut-in with the possibility of a civil penalty. As in the 
nuclear sector, component testing is conducted on a regular basis, but the record of results stays 
with the operator and is shared with an inspector only during inspections; in the NRC regime, 
incidents are reported to the regulator at the time they occur.  
INCs that may signal a precursor to a SUEH are listed below. These events can be 
recorded during inspection and further investigated by a regulator to identify accident precursors. 
In the current regulatory regime, these BOEMRE investigations of potential SUEH precursors 
may be the closest system in place that can provide the necessary information.  
INCs of Possible Relevance for Accident Sequence Precursors 
  Platforms and structures structural integrity 
  Accident reporting following fatalities, injuries, lost time, evacuation, loss of well 
control, fires, explosions 
  During unannounced oil spill drill, ability to carry out plan 
  Observed oil discharges reported 
  Casing setting depths more than 100 ft total vertical depth from the approved application 
for permit to drill  
  Drilling suspended when safe margin between drilling fluid weight in use and equivalent 
drilling fluid weight at the casing shoe not maintained.  
  Flared or vented oil well gas in excess of 48 continuous hrs or 144 cumulative hrs during 
month 
  Pipeline properly maintained 
  Pipeline-to-electrolyte potential measurements  
  Pipeline hydrostatic tests 
  Pipeline (component) repair 
  Pipeline failure Resources for the Future  Cooke, Ross, and Stern 
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  Well flow potential test 
  Well tests reports 
  Calibration reports 
  Major equipment failure 
  Cable, pipeline, facility damage 
  Annual self inspections 
  Report on annual self-inspections 
  Incident involving fatalities, injuries, lost time, evacuation, fires, explosions, collisions, 
structural damages, crane incidents, safety system damages, personnel/material handling 
activities, firefighting systems, all incidents with damages > $25K. 
Using that list, inspectors may uncover accident precursors. However, the PINC system 
does not provide an ideal catchment, for these reasons: 
  The precursors are discovered during the inspector’s annual review of the logs, not 
reported by the operator when they occur.  
  As noted in Section 2, unavailabilities and degraded conditions constitute a significant 
fraction of the nuclear precursors. It is not clear that unavailabilities discovered during 
routine testing and maintenance are always logged, especially if the discovery is 
accidental—as it often is.  
  The great majority of the incidences of noncompliance would not be relevant for 
precursor analysis, and significant manpower effort is required to sift out the precursors. 
By comparison, in the ASP analyses for 2004 given in Appendix 2, 44 events were 
analyzed, leading to 17 accident precursors. 
  The punitive nature of the PINC system discourages voluntary reporting of accidentally 
discovered unavailabilities. 
For the above reasons, the PINC system is best suited to monitoring that required 
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4.2 National Response Center 
Any oil spill must be reported to the National Response Center, as stipulated in 30 CFR 
254.46. These reports differ widely in format and scope; there are no uniform reporting 
guidelines. Event descriptions are sometimes anecdotal and derivative and do not analyze causes. 
Although this system can provide a valuable check on the completeness of other reporting 
conduits, it is not by itself capable of supporting an ASP program.  
4.3 Incident Reporting  
In 2006, the Minerals Management Service revised its incident reporting requirements. 
The new Incident Reporting Rule (30 CFR 250.188) defines which incidents must be reported 
and broadens the scope of the reports, which must be submitted within 15 days. The following 
incidents fall under the mandatory reporting requirement: 
  All fatalities.  
  All injuries that require the evacuation of the injured person(s) from the facility to shore 
or to another offshore facility.  
  All losses of well control. “Loss of well control” means the uncontrolled flow of 
formation or other fluids, whether to an exposed formation (an underground blowout) or 
at the surface (a surface blowout). 
  Flow through a diverter.  
  Uncontrolled flow resulting from a failure of surface equipment or procedures.  
  All fires and explosions.  
  All reportable releases of hydrogen sulfide (H2S) gas, as defined in §250.490(l).  
  All collisions that result in property or equipment damage greater than $25,000. 
“Collision” means the act of a moving vessel (including an aircraft) striking another 
vessel, or striking a stationary vessel or object (e.g., a boat striking a drilling rig or 
platform). “Property or equipment damage” means the cost of labor and material to 
restore all affected items to their condition before the damage, including but not limited 
to the OCS facility, a vessel, helicopter, or equipment. It does not include the cost of 
salvage, cleaning, gas-freeing, dry docking, or demurrage.  Resources for the Future  Cooke, Ross, and Stern 
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  All incidents involving structural damage to an OCS facility. “Structural damage” means 
damage severe enough that operations on the facility cannot continue until repairs are 
made.  
  All incidents involving crane or personnel- or material-handling operations.  
  All incidents that damage or disable safety systems or equipment (including firefighting 
systems). 
BOEMRE may decide to conduct an incident investigation under the authority of 
Sections 22(d)(1) and (2) of the OCS Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1348(d)(1) and (2)). These are fact-
finding proceedings with no adverse parties whose purpose is to prepare a public report that 
determines the cause or causes of the incident. Persons giving testimony may have legal 
representation.  
The current incident reporting rule appears to provide an adequate vehicle from which to 
launch an ASP program. The following steps would lead to the establishment of an ASP-enabled 
incident reporting system: 
1.  Define the class of SUEH events.  
2.  On the basis of PRA models, design the set of generic event trees that have SUEH 
events as possible endpoints.  
3.  Ensure that all nodes in these generic event trees are captured in the incident reporting 
system, possibly requiring amendments to 30 CFR 250.188.  
4.  Design a control loop, possibly based on the PINC system, to ensure coverage of the 
incident reporting system, with appropriate sanctions for noncompliance.  
5.  Set up an analysis team within BOEMRE to map the SUEH-related incidents onto 
generic event trees. 
6.  Set up a review board consisting of industry and BOEMRE representatives.  
The detailed design of an ASP-compliant incident reporting system melded with the 
current systems is outside the scope of this paper. Suffice to remark at this juncture that the 
nuclear ASP program has been greatly facilitated and streamlined by automated software 
support. At its inception, the nuclear ASP program involved an annual commitment of some five 
man-years. That has been reduced to about one man-year. Because the oil and gas offshore sector 
is much larger, the manpower requirements will surely be greater, but so will the efficiencies 
gained by automation.  Resources for the Future  Cooke, Ross, and Stern 
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5. Further Steps 
A risk-informed regulatory regime requires a population-level, quantitative risk-
monitoring capability owned and operated by the regulatory authority. The Accident Sequence 
Precursor methodology provides this capability. The existing legal framework appears adequate 
to establish an ASP program for offshore. Preconditions for successful implementation—in terms 
of history of operational experience, similarity of installations, and inspections baseline—appear 
to be met.  
A prerequisite to any concrete steps toward deployment will be to conduct site visits with 
BOEMRE and with offshore industry, including operating companies, drilling companies and 
other service companies, to introduce the accident precursor methodology, encourage their input, 
and solicit their cooperation. Based on the results of these agency and industry interviews, 
developing an ASP program within the context of a risk-informed decision matrix for OCS 
activities will involve the following concurrent steps. 
1.  Develop one or more generic PRA models covering deepwater drilling and 
operations, as well as any shallow-water activities (drilling, operations, transport) that 
could pose significant risks to the public.  
2.  Incentivize operators to specialize and maintain their own site-specific PRA models 
and encourage a small group of industry leaders to form a users’ group.  
3.  Create regulatory incentives for risk-informed regulation analogous to NRC’s 
Maintenance Rule for the nuclear industry.  
4.  Design an ASP-enabled incident reporting system following the steps outlined in 
Section 4:  
a.  Define the class of SUEH events. 
b.  On the basis of PRA models, design the set of generic event trees that have 
SUEH events as possible endpoints. 
c.  Ensure that all nodes in these generic event trees are captured in the incident 
reporting system, possibly requiring amendments to 30 CFR 250.188. 
d.  Design a control loop, possibly based on the PINC system, to ensure coverage 
of the incident reporting system, with appropriate sanctions for 
noncompliance. 
e.  Set up an analysis team within BOEMRE to map the SUEH-related incidents 
onto generic event trees. 
f.  Set up a review board comprising industry and BOEMRE.  Resources for the Future  Cooke, Ross, and Stern 
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5.  Design feedback mechanisms for involving industry in efforts to optimize industry-
wide performance as measured by the ASP indicators. 
6.  Design an automation plan to streamline the ASP analysis. 
Specifically, within a six-month period, a steering group capable of marshalling resources 
within BOEMRE and liaising with experts from industry could establish and coordinate two 
working groups. Group 1 would undertake tasks 1, 2, and 3. Creating an initial list of generic 
event trees (task 1) and developing actionable proposals (tasks 2 and 3) are achievable goals 
within six months. Group 2 would monitor task 1 of Group 1 while elaborating proposals for 
implementing tasks 4 and 5. The goal of automated reporting should inform and constrain the 
activities of both groups, for which purpose the steering group would ensure proper coordination. 
Whereas the development of automated reporting with attendant cost savings transpired over 30 
years in the nuclear sector, a much shorter trajectory is necessary for BOEMRE because of the 
sheer volume of offshore activities.  
  Resources for the Future  Cooke, Ross, and Stern 
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